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Abstract
Election systems based on scores generally determine the winner by computing the score of
each candidate and the winner is the candidate with the best score. It would be natural to
expect that computing the winner of an election is at least as hard as computing the score of
a candidate. We show that this is not always the case. In particular, we show that for Young
elections for dichotomous preferences the winner problem is easy, while determining the score
of a candidate is hard. This complexity behavior has not been seen before and is unusual. The
easiness of the winner problem for dichotomous Young crucially uses the fact that dichotomous
preferences guarantee the transitivity of the majority relation. In addition to dichotomous
preferences we also look at single-peaked preferences, the most well-studied domain restriction
that guarantees the transitivity of the majority relation. We show that for the three major hard
election systems and their natural variants, dichotomous Young is the only case where winner
is easy and score is hard. This also solves an open question from Peters (2018), by providing a
polynomial-time algorithm for Dodgson score for single-peaked electorates.
1 Introduction
Election systems based on scores generally find a winner by computing the score of each candidate
and a candidate is a winner if they have the best score. Most election systems have easy score
problems and so finding a winner in this way is also easy. The three most-commonly studied
election systems where this is not the case are Young [29], Dodgson [8], and Kemeny [17]. The score
problem for each of these systems is NP-complete and the corresponding winner problems are each
Θp2-complete [2, 23, 14, 15].
In general it would seem that determining if a candidate is a winner of an election is at least as
hard as determining the score of a candidate. We show that this is not always the case. We show that
for Young elections for dichotomous preferences the score problem is hard and the winner problem is
easy. This is behavior that was not seen before in the computational study of voting. Dichotomous
preferences are a very natural way for voters to state their preferences, where they approve of a
subset of the candidates and disapprove of the others. In many situations voters may not be able
to state strict preferences over all of the candidates, but can state their approval/disapproval for
each candidate. Approval voting is the most well-known election system that uses dichotomous
∗Research done in part while on sabbatical at ETH-Zu¨rich and Heinrich-Heine-Universita¨t Du¨sseldorf.
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preferences as input. Additionally, most voting rules have definitions that apply or can be naturally
extended to dichotomous preferences.
The behavior of Young for dichotomous preferences is quite unusual and does not occur for
any of the obvious variations of the setting. When we instead consider strongYoung elections, in
which the score is based on how far removed the candidate is from becoming a Condorcet winner
(rather than a weak Condorcet winner as in Young), the score and winner problems for dichotomous
preferences are hard. This is also the case when the electorate is trichotomous (each voter ranks their
most-preferred, middle preferred, and least preferred candidates). Additionally, natural variants of
Dodgson and Kemeny for dichotomous preferences do not exhibit Young’s anomalous behavior:
Their score and winner problems are in P.
The computational easiness of the winner problem for Young for dichotomous preferences follows
from the fact that when the electorate is dichotomous, the majority relation is transitive. To
further explore this effect, we consider how having single-peaked preferences and how having single-
crossing preferences affects the complexity of the winner and score problems for Young, Kemeny,
and Dodgson elections. Single-peaked preferences [4] and single-crossing preferences [20] are the two
most-commonly studied domain restrictions that guarantee transitivity of the majority relation and
they each model the preferences of the voters with respect to a single polarizing issue. In the case
of single-peaked preferences, the axis is a total ordering of the candidates where candidates on the
leftmost/rightmost ends of the axis represent the extremes of the issue. In the case of single-crossing
preferences, the axis is a total ordering of the voters. We follow the model from Walsh [28] where
the axis is given as part of the input.
We consider the complexity of the score and winner problems for Young, strongYoung, Kemeny,
Dodgson, and weakDodgson elections for single-peaked and for single-crossing preferences. Except
for Dodgson and weakDodgson score for single-crossing preferences, which remain open, all score
and winner problems are in P. In proving our results, we solve an open problem from Peters [22] by
showing that computing the Dodgson score of a candidate is in P for single-peaked preferences.
2 Preliminaries
An election consists of a set of candidates C, and a set of voters V . Each voter v ∈ V has a
corresponding vote (preference order) over the set of candidates. The most commonly studied model
is for voters to state their preferences as a total order, i.e., strictly ranking all of the candidates from
most to least preferred. Another natural way for voters to state their preferences is as a dichotomous
order, where each voter approves of a subset of the candidates and disapproves of the remaining
candidates. More formally, given a set of candidates C, a dichotomous vote v partitions C into two
sets, A and B (which may be empty), with the vote written as (A > B), such that for all a ∈ A
and for all b ∈ B, v states a > b (where > denotes strict preference) and v does not state strict
preference between candidates in A nor between candidates in B.
An election system is a mapping from an election (a set of candidates and a set of voters) to a
subset of the candidate set referred to as the winner(s). We are interested in the relationship between
the complexity of the score and winner problems for election systems so we focus on election systems
with computationally difficult score problems: Young [29], Dodgson [8], and Kemeny [17], and some
of their related variants.
For our results and to define the election systems mentioned above, it will be useful to refer to
Condorcet winners and weak Condorcet winners. A Condorcet winner is a candidate in an election
that beats each other candidate by pairwise majority. Similarly, a weak Condorcet winner is a
candidate that beats-or-ties each other candidate by pairwise majority.
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The Young score of a candidate is the size of a largest subset of voters for which they are a weak
Condorcet winner. A candidate is a Young winner if they have maximum Young score. Notice that
the definition of Young applies to dichotomous preferences. We also consider the common slight
variant of Young called strongYoung, in which the goal is to make a candidate a Condorcet winner
(instead of a weak Condorcet winner).
For total order votes, the Dodgson score of a candidate is the fewest number of swaps between
adjacent candidates in the voters’ rankings such that they can become a Condorcet winner. A
candidate is a Dodgson winner if they have minimum Dodgson score. The definition for weakDodgson
is the same except we consider if a candidate can become a weak Condorcet winner. For dichotomous
preferences, a natural analogue for Dodgson is to move candidates between the two groups in a
dichotomous vote, which keeps the votes dichotomous, e.g., given the vote ({a, b} > {c, d}) we can
move c up to get ({a, b, c} > {d}) with one move.
A Kemeny consensus is a total order > with minimal sum of Kendall tau distance to the voters,
i.e.,
∑
a>bN(b, a), where N(b, a) denotes the number of voters that state b > a. The Kemeny score
of a candidate p is the minimal sum of Kendall tau distance to the voters for a total order that has p
as most preferred. For dichotomous preferences, we consider two variants of Kemeny introduced by
Zwicker [30] called (2, 2)-Kemeny and (2,m)-Kemeny. In both systems, the votes are dichotomous.1
In (2, 2)-Kemeny, the consensus is also dichotomous. In (2,m)-Kemeny, the consensus is a total
order. Having a total order consensus allows expressing more information about the electorate,
which sometimes may be more appropriate [1]. In (2, 2)-Kemeny and (2,m)-Kemeny, the score of
ranking > is
∑
a>b(N(a, b)−N(b, a)) and we are looking to maximize the score.
We now define the score and winner decision problems with Young as an example. Note that in
Young we are looking to maximize the score (as is the case for (2, 2)-Kemeny and (2,m)-Kemeny),
but in Dodgson and Kemeny we are looking to minimize the score and so the decision problems for
these systems must be adjusted accordingly.
Name: YoungScore
Given: Given an election (C, V ), a candidate p ∈ C, and a number k.
Question: Is the Young score of p at least k?
Name: YoungWinner
Given: Given an election (C, V ) and a candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Does p have highest Young score?
Our computational results involve the classes P, NP, and Θp2. The class Θ
p
2 was first studied
by Papadimitriou and Zachos [21], named by Wagner [27], and shown by Hemachandra [13] to be
equivalent to PNP|| , the class of problems solvable by a polynomial-time oracle machine that asks all
of its queries to an NP oracle in parallel. Note that NP ∪ coNP ⊆ Θp2 ⊆ P
NP.
3 Dichotomous Preferences
For total order votes, the winner problems for Young, strongYoung, Dodgson, weakDodgson, and
Kemeny are Θp2-complete [5, 23, 14, 5, 15]. The Θ
p
2 upper bounds for these problems are shown as
follows: Use the associated NP-complete score problem, and compute the scores of all candidates in
parallel in polynomial time.
An election system is weakCondorcet-consistent if on every input that has at least one weak
Condorcet winner, the winners of the election system are exactly the weak Condorcet winners. If an
1The definition of dichotomous votes used by Zwicker [30] requires that each of the two groups are nonempty.
However, this does not make a difference in the results in this paper.
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election has dichotomous votes then it has at least one weak Condorcet winner [16], which implies
the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The winner problem for a weakCondorcet-consistent election system with dichotomous
preferences is in P. This holds even for election systems that are weakCondorcet-consistent when
restricted to dichotomous preferences.
3.1 Young Elections
Theorem 2 For dichotomous preferences, YoungWinner is in P and YoungScore is NP-complete.
Proof. Since Young is weakCondorcet-consistent [10], YoungWinner in P follows from Theorem 1.
We will now show that YoungScore remains NP-complete for dichotomous preferences. And so
the “natural” way of deciding YoungWinner by using YoungScore as an oracle is not optimal.
We reduce from Independent-Set. Given a graph G = (V,E), let the candidate set be E ∪ {p}
and let the voter set consist of the following voters.
• For each vertex v ∈ V , one voter corresponding to v voting ({e ∈ E | v ∈ e} > · · · ).
• One voter voting ({p} > · · · ).
Note that the Young score of p is α(G) + 1, where α is the independence number of G, i.e., the size
of a maximum independent set of G. This score is realized by the voter that ranks p first and a set
of voters corresponding to a maximum-size independent set of G. Note that the proof of the current
theorem does not contradict the previous statement that YoungWinner is in P, since p is clearly in
general not a Young winner. Also note that this construction does not give NP-completeness for
YoungScore for total orders. Not surprisingly, it turns out that that problem is also NP-complete
(even to approximate [6]). Somewhat surprisingly, a direct proof of NP-completeness is not given in
the literature, but it is implicit in the proof of Rothe, Spakowski, and Vogel [23].2
It may be surprising that the construction for total orders is harder than the one for dichotomous
preferences, because it may seem that a problem on total orders would be harder than the analogous
problem for dichotomous preferences. However, for the plurality rule, control by adding voters can
be NP-complete for votes with ties [11] while it is in P for total orders [3]. And it is easy to see that
dichotomous votes suffice to get NP-completeness. ❑
Add an additional vote ({p} > · · · ) to get the following.
Theorem 3 strongYoungScore for dichotomous preferences is NP-complete.
We now consider the ranking problem, which is the problem that asks given two candidates c
and d whether the score of c is at least the score of d. This will be used as an intermediate problem
to show the hardness of strongYoungWinner and for Young, to further contrast the complexity of
the score, ranking, and winner problems. The construction also shows that the YoungLoser problem
is Θp2-complete, in stark contrast to the YoungWinner problem.
Theorem 4 YoungRanking for dichotomous preferences is Θp2-complete.
2It is interesting to note that the NP-completeness of YoungScore does not directly follow from the Θp
2
-completeness
of YoungWinner and strongYoungWinner: Under the assumption that NP does not have p-measure 0, there exists
a set A that is NP-complete under truth-table reductions, but not NP-complete (under many-one reductions) [18].
Note that YoungWinner and strongYoungWinner are in PAtt, though A is not NP-complete.
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Proof. Reduce fromMin-Card-Independent-Set-Compare, in which we are given two graphsG and
H with the same number of vertices and we ask if α(G) ≥ α(H). This problem is Θp2-complete [26]
(for an explicit proof, see [25]).
Without loss of generality, assume that G and H both contain at least one edge (so that α(G) <
‖V (H)‖ and α(H) < ‖V (G)‖) and that the sets of vertices are disjoint. Our reduction generalizes
the YoungScore reduction from the proof of Theorem 2. We will ensure that the Young score of p is
α(G) + 1 + ‖V (H)‖ + 1 and that the Young score of r is α(H) + 1 + ‖V (G)‖ + 1. This proves the
theorem, since ‖V (G)‖ = ‖V (H)‖.
Let the candidate set be E(G)∪E(H)∪{p, r} and let the voter set consist of the following voters.
Type I For each v ∈ V (G), one voter corresponding to v voting ({r} ∪ E(H) ∪ {e ∈ E(G) | v ∈
e} > · · · ).
Type II One voter voting (E(H) ∪ {p, r} > · · · ).
Type III For each v ∈ V (H), one voter corresponding to v voting ({p} ∪ E(G) ∪ {e ∈ E(H) | v ∈
e} > · · · ).
Type IV One voter voting (E(G) ∪ {p, r} > · · · ).
Note that to realize the Young score of p, we should always include all the Type III and Type IV
voters. The rest of the argument is as in the proof of Theorem 2. Note that p ties-or-beats each
candidate in E(H), since we are including α(G) < ‖V (H)‖ Type I votes. ❑
Add a vote (E(H) ∪ {p, r} > · · · ) and a vote (E(G) ∪ {p, r} > · · · ) to get the following.
Theorem 5 strongYoungRanking for dichotomous preferences is Θp2-complete.
As stated in Theorem 2, YoungWinner is in P for dichotomous votes. In contrast, the winner
problem for strongYoung for dichotomous votes is Θp2-complete.
Theorem 6 strongYoungWinner for dichotomous preferences is Θp2-complete.
Proof. The main insight here is that we can always make sure that a candidate c’s strongYoung
score is 0, by adding a candidate c′ and making sure that c and c′ are tied in every vote. We adapt
the construction used to show that strongYoungRanking for dichotomous preferences is Θp2-complete
from Theorem 5. For each e ∈ E(G) ∪ E(H), add a candidate e′ and make sure that e and e′ are
tied in every vote. ❑
It is interesting to see that our Θp2-completeness proofs for dichotomous preferences are also
significantly easier than those for total orders [23].
Note that the approach from Theorem 6 does not work for YoungWinner. Rothe, Spakowski,
and Vogel [23] reduce the strongYoungRanking to strongYoungWinner problem by replacing each
candidate g other than c and d by ‖V ‖ new candidates g0, . . . , g‖V ‖−1, and by replacing the occur-
rence of g in the ith voter by gi > gi+1 > · · · > gi+‖V ‖−1 (modulo ‖V ‖). This does not change the
scores of c and d, but ensures that the strongYoung score of every other candidate is at most 1, and
so we can ensure that these candidates are never winners in the image of the reduction. Note that
this construction does not work for dichotomous preferences (which is consistent with the Theorem 2
result that YoungWinner for dichotomous preferences is in P). The construction also does not work
for trichotomous preferences, or indeed for any k-chotomous preferences.
However, we can adapt the construction used to show that YoungRanking for dichotomous
preferences is Θp2-complete from Theorem 4. For details, see the appendix.
Theorem 7 YoungWinner for trichotomous preferences is Θp2-complete.
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3.2 Dodgson Elections
We now show that the complexity behavior of Young for dichotomous preferences does not occur
for Dodgson and Kemeny for dichotomous preferences.
Recall that for Dodgson for dichotomous preferences a candidate can only be swapped up from
disapproved to approved or swapped down from approved to disapproved. So unlike in the case for
total orders, to determine the score of a candidate we cannot just consider swaps that move that
candidate up. For example, given the vote ({a, b} > {c, d}), for c to beat a pairwise, we first need
to move c up to get ({a, b, c} > {d}) and then move a down to get ({b, c} > {a, d}). (We could of
course also do these moves in the reverse order.) With this in mind, we can show that DodgsonScore
and weakDodgsonScore are each in P (and so are the corresponding winner problems).
Theorem 8 DodgsonScore and weakDodgsonScore, for dichotomous preferences, are each in P.
Proof. First notice that moving p up from the set of disapproved candidates in a vote to the set
of approved candidates decreases N(a, p) − N(p, a) by 1 for every candidate a ∈ C − {p}. And it
is not possible to decrease N(a, p)−N(p, a) by more than 1 with one move. So, the weakDodgson
score of p is the max over all candidates a ∈ C − {p} of N(a, p)− N(p, a): We can make p a weak
Condorcet winner by moving p up from disapproved to approved in that many votes and it is easy
to see that there are enough votes to do this. So, weakDodgsonScore is in P.
For DodgsonScore, if p starts out as a Condorcet winner, the score is 0. Otherwise, we need to
move p up in one more vote compared to what was needed to make p a weak Condorcet winner. If
no such vote exists then for some candidate a, a > p in each original vote. In this case, move p up
in every vote, and then for every candidate a for which a and p are tied, move that candidate down.
So, DodgsonScore is also in P. ❑
3.3 Kemeny Elections
Zwicker [30] shows that the winner problems for (2, 2)-Kemeny and (2,m)-Kemeny are in P. An easy
way to see this for (2, 2)-Kemeny is because this is the same as the mean rule [30]. Computing the
score of a candidate p is a little harder, since we need to rank p (tied for) first in a dichotomous
ranking, and so we are not ranking according to approval score (as in the mean rule). However,
a similar argument to what is used in the proof of Lemma 3 from Zwicker [30], which computes a
k-chotomous consensus, can be used to show that the score problem for (2, 2)-Kemeny is also in P.
For Kemeny versions that require a total order consensus (such as (2,m)-Kemeny) we will show
that the score problem polynomial-time Turing-reduces to the winner problem, which implies that
the score problem is in P if the winner problem is in P. And it follows that (2,m)-KemenyScore is
in P.
Theorem 9 For each preference domain D that is closed when candidates are removed, Ke-
menyScore for D-preferences polynomial-time Turing-reduces to KemenyWinner for D-preferences
with a total order consensus.
Proof. The reduction in the theorem above works in the following way. To compute the Kemeny
score of candidate p, we need to compute the score of a total order that ranks p first. So, put p first
in the total order. The contribution of p to the score is independent of how the remaining candidates
are ordered (for example, p contributes
∑
c 6=p(N(p, c)−N(c, p)) for (2,m)-Kemeny). For an optimal
order, we need to order C − {p} such that the order restricted to those candidates is optimal, i.e.,
we need to compute a Kemeny consensus of the electorate restricted to C − {p}.
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So, delete p and repeatedly query whether a candidate a is a winner. If so, put a next in the
order and delete a. This builds an optimal total order with p first. It is clear this argument holds
for preference domains that are closed under removal of candidates and this includes total order,
dichotomous, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences. ❑
4 Single-Peaked Preferences
Single-peaked preferences model the preferences of the electorate with respect to a one-dimensional
axis L, a total ordering of the candidates, where each voter has a single most preferred candidate
(their peak) and candidates farther to the leftmost (rightmost) ends of the axis are strictly less
preferred. More formally, for every triple of candidates aLbLc or cLbLa, for every voter v ∈ V if v
states a > b then v states b > c.
The pairwise majority relation for single-peaked preferences is transitive. Brandt et al. [5] show
that it follows from their Theorem 3.2 (the analogue of Theorem 1) that the winner problems for
Kemeny, Young, and weakDodgson are in P. They also show that the winner problems for strong-
Young and Dodgson are in P.
So, what happens to the single-peaked score problems of the systems mentioned above?
Dodgson Elections Peters [22] states that “... while Brandt et al. (2015) give an efficient
algorithm for finding a Dodgson winner in the case of single-peaked preferences, the problem of
efficiently calculating scores appears to be open and non-trivial.” The reason for this nontriviality
is that after swapping, the electorate is not required to be single-peaked (see [5, Footnote 5]). This
makes single-peaked Dodgson very different from single-peaked Kemeny and Young, where we will
never get non-single-peaked electorates in the computation. We will show below that for Young and
Kemeny, the single-peaked score problem is in P.
More surprisingly, we also show the following theorem.
Theorem 10 DodgsonScore and weakDodgsonScore for single-peaked preferences are in P.
Proof. We start with an example that shows the core argument of our algorithm. Suppose the
societal axis is a1La2La3La4Lp and suppose our election consists of the following types of votes.
10 votes of the form ({a1, a2, a3, a4} > p).
50 votes of the form ({a2, a3, a4} > p > · · · ).
10 votes of the form ({a3, a4} > p > · · · ).
20 votes of the form ({a4} > p > · · · ).
11 votes of the form (p > · · · ).
In order for p to become a Condorcet winner, every candidate other than p can be preferred to p
by at most 50 voters. p does not need any votes over a1, and we leave the 10 votes of the form
({a1, a2, a3, a4} > p) as is. p needs 10 votes over a2. In 10 of the votes of the form ({a2, a3, a4} >
p > · · · ), we swap p to the top of the order (using 30 swaps total) and we leave the remaining 40
votes of this form as is. Note that in the resulting set of votes:
10 votes of the form ({a1, a2, a3, a4} > p).
40 votes of the form ({a2, a3, a4} > p > · · · ).
10 votes of the form (p > {a2, a3, a4} > · · · ).
a2, a3, and a4 are preferred to p by 50 voters. This implies that we need to swap p to the top
of the preference order in all votes of the form ({a3, a4} > p > · · · ) and all votes of the form
({a4} > p > · · · ). Note that no swap is wasted, and so p has a Dodgson score of 70.
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We now show that this approach can be generalized to all single-peaked electorates. Let the
societal axis be a1La2L · · ·LamaLpLbmbL · · ·Lb2Lb1. Our goal is to compute the (Dodgson or
weakDodgson) score of p. Let H (for “half”) be the maximum number of voters that can prefer c
to p while making p a winner. To be precise, in the case of Dodgson winner, H is ⌊(n+ 1)/2⌋, and
in the case of weakDodgson winner, H is ⌊n/2⌋, where n is the number of voters. In the example
above, H is 50. We will show that we can make p a winner without wasting swaps, i.e., in the
election that makes p a winner, c is preferred to p by exactly H voters for every candidate c such
that N(c, p) > H , and by N(c, p) voters for every candidate c such that N(c, p) ≤ H . Since we are
not wasting swaps, this witnesses the Dodgson score of p (with value
∑
c 6=p,N(c,p)>H(N(c, p)−H)).
Note that in each single-peaked vote, p is preferred to all a candidates or to all b candidates.
So, when we swap p up in a vote, this will help p against a candidates or against b candidates, but
not against both. This implies that we can treat the a candidates and b candidates separately. We
will show that we can ensure that each a candidate is preferred to p by at most H voters without
wasting swaps. The same holds for the b candidates, which proves the theorem.
As in the example, we classify the voters in terms of the set of a candidates that are preferred to p.
For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ma, let ki be the number of voters with a vote of the form ({ai, ai+1, . . . , ama} >
p > · · · ) and let k0 be the number of voters that prefer p to all a candidates. So, N(ai, p) =
∑i
j=1 kj ,
the total number of voters is n =
∑ma
i=0 ki, and H is defined as above.
If for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ma, N(ai, p) ≤ H , then p does not need to gain any points over a candidates.
Otherwise, let i0 be the smallest index such that N(ai0 , p) > H . We now swap p to top of the
preference order of N(ai0 , p)−H voters with a vote of the form ({ai0 , ai0+1, . . . , ama} > p > · · · ).
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Also, for all i, i0 < i ≤ ma, we swap p to the top of the preference order of all the voters with a vote
of the form ({ai, ai+1, . . . , ama} > p > · · · ).
We now show that after swapping, each a candidate is preferred to p by at most H voters without
wasting swaps. That is, ai is preferred to p by H voters for all i ≥ i0 and ai is preferred to p by
N(ai, p) voters for all i < i0.
For i < i0, since we never swap p over ai, it is immediate that ai is preferred to p by the same
voters as in the original election. For i ≥ i0, ai is preferred to p by all unchanged voters that prefer
ai to p. And there are exactly
∑i0−1
i=1 ki + ki0 − (N(ai0 , p)−H) = N(ai0 , p)− (N(ai0 , p)−H) = H
such voters. ❑
The proof of the above theorem shows that for single-peaked electorates, the Dodgson score of
p is equal to
∑
c 6=p,N(c,p)>H(N(c, p) −H). This also gives a simple algorithm for DodgsonWinner.
Though this problem was known to be in P [5], that algorithm was more complicated, since it did
not look at the form of the entire single-peaked electorate in the way we do in our proof.
Young Elections It is easy to see that we can adapt the construction for Dodgson from the
previous section to Young. For every voter that we swap p to the top of the preference order of in
the Dodgson construction, we now delete that voter. It is easy to see that this gives the minimum
number of voters to delete in order for p to become a Condorcet (weak Condorcet) winner, and
so the number of remaining voters is exactly the strongYoung (Young) score of p. This result also
follows from the result that constructive control by deleting voters for Condorcet and weak Condorcet
elections are each in P [5].
Kemeny Elections Brandt et al. [5] show that KemenyWinner for single-peaked preferences is
in P. Since we are computing a total order consensus, it follows from Theorem 9 that KemenyScore
3Note that N(ai0 , p) − H ≤ ki0 . This is immediate if i0 = 1. If i0 > 1, N(ai0−1, p) ≤ H, and thus N(ai0 , p) ≤
H + ki0 .
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for single-peaked preferences Turing-reduces to KemenyWinner for single-peaked preferences, and is
thus also in P.
5 Single-Crossing Preferences
Another important domain restriction that ensures the majority relation is transitive is the
single-crossing restriction [20], where the voters can be ordered along a one-dimensional axis
L = v1Lv2L . . . Lvn such that for each pair of candidates a, b ∈ C all of the voters that state
a > b precede the voters that state b > a, i.e., there is a single crossing point for each pair.
As in the case for dichotomous preferences and for single-peaked preferences, we immediately
obtain that YoungWinner and weakDodgsonWinner are each in P. It follows from Magiera and
Faliszewski [19] that strongYoungScore and strongYoungWinner are each in P. As mentioned by
Cornaz et al. [7], KemenyWinner for single-crossing elections is in P. This immediately implies using
Theorem 9 that KemenyScore is in P.
An important property for the complexity is the fact that single-crossing elections have a variant
of the median voter theorem, in that the median voter(s) represent the majority relation [24, 12].
The following corollary extracts the properties that we need.
Corollary 11 Let v1Lv2L . . . Lvn be a single-crossing order of voters. A candidate p is a weak
Condorcet winner if and only if
• n is odd and p is the most preferred candidate of the median voter.
• n is even and for every a 6= p, a is preferred to p by at most one of the two median voters (and
a > p by exactly one of the median voters if and only if p and a are tied).
Theorem 12 YoungScore for single-crossing preferences is in P.
Proof. For every voter v that has p at the top of its preference order, keep a maximum odd
number of voters such that v is the median voter. If the number of remaining voters is greater than
the current best score, this becomes the current best score.
For every pair of voters v and w, if there is a candidate a 6= p that is preferred to p by v and w,
go to the next loop iteration. Otherwise, keep a maximum even number of voters such that v and w
are the two median voters. If the number of remaining voters is greater than the current best score,
this becomes the current best score. ❑
Theorem 13 DodgsonWinner for single-crossing preferences is in P.
Proof. This is trivial if there are an odd number of voters. So, assume that the number of voters
is even. We will show that every Dodgson winner is a weak Condorcet winner, and that the Dodgson
scores of weak Condorcet winners are easy to compute. This immediately implies the theorem, since
the Dodgson winners are the weak Condorcet winners with lowest Dodgson score.
Suppose p is a weak Condorcet winner. It follows from Corollary 11 that for every candidate
a 6= p, p is preferred to a by at least one of the median voters and a is preferred to p by one of the
median voters if and only if a is tied with p pairwise. To make p a Condorcet winner with a minimal
number of swaps, it suffices to swap p to the top of the two median voters. This gives a Dodgson
score of ‖{a ∈ C − {p} | p ties a}‖.
If q is not a weak Condorcet winner, then there is a weak Condorcet winner p such that p beats
q pairwise. It is easy to see that the Dodgson score of q is greater than the Dodgson score of p, since
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for every candidate a ∈ C −{p, q}, if p needs a vote over a, then so does q. In addition, q needs two
votes over p. It follows that the Dodgson score of q is greater than ‖{a ∈ C −{p} | p ties a}‖ which
is the Dodgson score of p. ❑
It is interesting to see that the algorithm for DodgsonWinner for single-crossing preferences from
the previous theorem is similar to the algorithm for single-peaked preferences from Brandt et al. [5],
in that there it also was shown that only weak Condorcet winners can be winners and how to
compute the Dodgson score of a weak Condorcet winner. In Theorem 10, we finally solved the open
problem of computing the Dodgson and weakDodgson scores for single-peaked preferences. We have
not managed to solve the complexity of these problems for single-crossing electorates. Recall that it
was crucial that in the single-peaked case we could always realize the score without wasting swaps.
That is not the case in the single-crossing case, as shown by the following simple example. This
gives some indication that the single-crossing case may be harder to handle.
Example 14 Consider the following four voters, single-crossing w.r.t. the ordering v1Lv2Lv3Lv4.
v1 voting (a > b > p > c).
v2 voting (a > b > p > c).
v3 voting (a > c > p > b).
v4 voting (a > c > p > b).
To become a Condorcet winner p needs one vote over b, one vote over c, and three votes over a.
However, the three votes over a can only be obtained by wasting an extra swap over either b or c.
So the Dodgson score of p is six.
6 Future Work
Our major open question is the complexity of Dodgson score for single-crossing elections. Using the
phrasing of Peters [22]: while we give an efficient algorithm for finding a Dodgson winner in the
case of single-crossing preferences, the problem of efficiently calculating scores appears to be open
and nontrivial.
We also point out that there are other options for “dichotomous Kemeny” depending on the
amount a tie contributes to the distance. Kemeny [17] adds 0.5 and Fagin et al. [9] considers all
penalty values between 0 and 1. It should be noted that (2, 2)-Kemeny does not correspond to any
of these penalty values, since this system depends solely on the induced majority graph, whereas
the others do not. Computing a dichotomous consensus for p > 0 is a very interesting challenge.
(Computing a total order consensus is equivalent to (2,m)-Kemeny.)
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 7: YoungWinner for trichotomous preferences is Θ
p
2-
complete.
Proof. The main insight is that we can make sure that candidate c’s Young score is relatively
low, by adding candidates c′ and c′′, tied with c in each original vote, and adding, for some large
integer B, the following 6B voters.
• B voters voting (c > c′ > · · · ).
• B voters voting (· · · > c > c′).
• B voters voting (c′ > c′′ > · · · ).
• B voters voting (· · · > c′ > c′′).
• B voters voting (c′′ > c > · · · ).
• B voters voting (· · · > c′′ > c).
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Note that the Young scores of c, c′, and c′′ are at most n− 2B, where n is the number of voters.
We adapt the construction used to show that YoungRanking is Θp2-hard from Theorem 4. For
each e ∈ E(G) ∪ E(H), we add e′ and e′′, we replace each occurrence of e in the original votes by
e, e′, e′′, and we add 6‖V (G)‖ voters as specified above, taking B = ‖V (G)‖. For readability, we
write “E for {e, e′, e′′ | e ∈ E}. This gives the following set of voters.
Type I For each vertex v ∈ V (G),
• One voter corresponding to v voting
({r} ∪’E(H) ∪ ¤ {e ∈ E(G) | v ∈ e} > · · · ).
Type II
• One voter voting (’E(H) ∪ {p, r} > · · · ).
Type III For each vertex v ∈ V (H),
• One voter corresponding to v voting
({p} ∪’E(G) ∪ ¤ {e ∈ E(H) | v ∈ e} > · · · ).
Type IV
• One voter voting (’E(G) ∪ {p, r} > · · · ).
Type V For each e ∈ V (G) ∪ V (H),
• ‖V (G)‖ voters voting (e > e′ > · · · ).
• ‖V (G)‖ voters voting (· · · > e > e′).
• ‖V (G)‖ voters voting (e′ > e′′ > · · · ).
• ‖V (G)‖ voters voting (· · · > e′ > e′′).
• ‖V (G)‖ voters voting (e′′ > e > · · · ).
• ‖V (G)‖ voters voting (· · · > e′′ > e).
It is immediate that for all c 6= p, r, YoungScore(c) ≤ n − 2‖V (G)‖. We will show that
YoungScore(p) = n − ‖V (G)‖ + α(G) and YoungScore(r) = n − ‖V (H)‖ + α(H). Since ‖V (G)‖ =
‖V (H)‖, it follows that α(G) ≥ α(H) if and only if p is a Young winner, which completes the proof.
We will show that YoungScore(p) = n− ‖V (G)‖+ α(G). YoungScore(r) = n− ‖V (H)‖+ α(H)
follows by symmetry.
Let W be a set of voters that realizes the Young score of p with a maximal number of Type V
voters. Note that all the voters that rank p tied for first are in W . So, all Type II, III, and IV
voters, and half of the Type V voters are in W .
Next, we will show that W contains all Type V voters. Suppose it does not. Then there is an
e ∈ E(G) such that there is a voter w voting e > e′ > · · · or e′ > e′′ > · · · or e′′ > e > · · · that
is not in W . Since W contains a maximal number of Type V voters, adding w to W will cause p
to not be a weak Condorcet winner. It follows that W contains a Type I voter w′ that prefers e,
e′, and e′′ to p. But note that p is still a weak Condorcet winner in W if we replace w′ by w (since
p does not do worse against any candidate in w compared to w′). This contradicts the assumption
that W contains a maximal number of Type V voters.
So, W contains all Type II, III, IV, and V voters. Then W contains α(G) Type I voters corre-
sponding to a maximum independent set of G (recall that α(G) < ‖V (H)‖). ❑
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